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IN THE SUPREME COU$1 .. ~IU 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~\tED 
EDWARD L. G ILLMOI. EDjlJr " '2 l95A 
\V .t\llD LESLIE GILLMOR and --------------:··---~~e l!~~~~~~l~ ~i~c~~~J~·&it·s·., "':: ·c~urr. Ut•0 
Jl ANY, formerly known as Island 
Improvement Company, Case N 0 • 
Plaintiffs and Respondents_, 9993 
vs. 
EL\VOOD B. CARTER dba SERV-
ICE SALT COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appeal from a Summary Judgment of the District Court of 
Salt Lake County, Bon. A. B. Ellett, District Judge 
ALLEN H. TIBBALS 
315 East 2nd South St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plain tiffs 
and Respondents 
WILLIAM H. HENDERSON 
711 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant 
APR29 196~ 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I·~ D '', ~ \ 1 t I> 1 J. GIL r~ ~ r oR, ED-
\r~\ltD LESI~IE GILLMOR and 
c. l·,ltt\XCIS GILLMOR, JR. and 
the ISL11\XI> 1{"\.NCHING COM-
I>,\ N 'r. fortnerly known as Island 
ln1provc1nent Cotnpany, \Case No. 
Jlfainlifl's and Respondents~ I 9993 
vs. 
~~~IJ\\'()()D ll. CAR'l,ER dba SERV-
ICJ.~ S.L\ 1_/f COMPANY, I 
Defendant and Appellant. J 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The appellant respectfully petitions for a rehearing 
in the aboYe matter for the follo"ring reasons: 
1. TilE DE(;ISION OF THE COURT IS 
t·XIX'l'}:LLI(;I\BLE IN THE LIGHT OF 
THE RECORD AND POINT UPON WHICH 
APPELLANT RELIED UPON APPEAL. THE 
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COUR'l" ENTIRELY MISCONSTRUED 'fHE 
ISSUES IN,TOL VED IN THIS CAUSE. 
(a) The Supreme Court~s Misconception of the 
Issues in This Cause. 
Here is how the Supreme Court misconstrued the 
issues and then proceeded to try the case upon affidavits 
and deposition on this incorrect issue. 
The Supreme Court conceived plaintiff's issue to 
be that he had acquired a prescriptive right by person· 
ally using the road in controversy for over 30 years: 
"He [appellant) also averred that he had ac· 
quired a prescriptive right by using said road 
openly and freely for a period of over 30 years." 
- (P. I, para. 2, Opinion). 
Appellant's personal use of the road for the pre-
scriptive period was not the issue as we hereinafter 
show. 
The Supreme Court then observed from appellant's 
deposition, that appellant had only used the road for 
the purpose of hauling salt personally only a year and 
a half before the commencent of this suit: 
"His [appellant's) use of the road for the pur-
pose of hauling salt, however, commenced ap· 
proximately only a year and a half before the 
commencement of this suit." 
- (P. I, para. 3, Opinion). 
The court then proceeds to rule that because appel· 
lant admitted he had only used the road personally to 
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haul salt for ouly a year and a half, he couldn't have 
u'e< l it for ao years, and obtained a prescriptive right: 
( P. :! , para. 4) . 
.. By appellant's O\Vll admission i~ his deposi-
tion he had used the road for hauhng salt only 
a pproxitna te ly one and one-half years before 
this nl't ion \Vas started. He therefore could not 
hn ,.e acquired a prescriptive right for the use of 
the road for such purpose." 
'rhis is all ,·ery fine, but this was not the issue. 
Pluintitl. did not claim his prescriptive right to use the 
road to haul salt \\'as by virtue of only his personal use 
ot' the road for 30 years. Appellant's claim was the 
State of Utah, owner of the leased land had, by virtue 
of appellant's use of the road to haul salt, together with 
the use of the road for this purpose by appellant's prede-
l'l'ssors (prior lessees) the State of Utah, lessor, had 
ncquired a prescriptiYe right to haul salt from said state 
salt lnnds \vhich appellant leased from the State of 
l Ttah, all as appears in Point 2 following. 
·) 'fHE ISSUES WHICH PLAINTIFF 
l{j.~LIED lrPON IN THIS CAUSE AND THE 
POIX'f lTI>()N 'VHICH APPELLANT RE-
LIED lTP()X ON '"fHIS APPEAL. 
I>lnintiff did not base his right to haul salt upon 
the road solely upon his own use of the road for such 
purpose, because he had only personally used the road 
for that purpose for more than a year and a half or so . 
. \ppellant's claitn 'vas that appellant and his predeces-
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sors in interest had together obtained a prescriptive 
right to use the road. Thus the pleadings were, 
"Continuously and for a period of more than 
30 years prior thereto, the defendant and his 
predecessors in interest had used freely and 
openly and without restraint," 
the road in controversy. (See page 5, Brief of appel-
lant). 
Briefly, the situation is this: Appellant leases salt 
lands from the State of Utah for his salt business. The 
road in controversy is the road which has been used to 
haul salt from these lands. Appellant claims there is 
an easement to use this road for the hauling of the salt 
appurtenant to the land that appellant leases from the 
state. The claim is that the easement was established 
by the state's use of the road to reach its salt lands and 
by adverse use of this road by state lessees from at lea.Jt 
1939 until 1962, a period of over 20 years. The State 
also used this road to reach State Lands and its use was 
not limited and restricted. 
Appellant found it difficult to obtain affidavits 
from people, who for various reasons do not wish to 
become involved in the controversy. (P. 11, Brief). It 
has been said : 
"Hear one side and you are in the dark. Hear 
both sides and all will be clear." 
But the affidavits which appellant did file (pages 
93 to 105 of the record) show these leases-and the 
Thomas affidavit specifically show adverse and open 
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usc heginning 193U. (Sec l)oint II, page 13-1~, appel-
ltult's Brief'). 
'rhc hn\· is r lear. 1 \.ppellant claims an easement a p-
purtcnant to the salt lands he leased from the State of 
L~ tuh acquired hy use of the road in controversy by the 
state.· and hy lessees of the state who hauled salt from 
the state salt lands. Such an easement would be appur-
tenant to the lands. As is stated in 17 (a} Am. J ur. 
Prud .. page 7 ;):L 7:3~3. sec. 149: 
"..{ \ n appurtenant ease1nent is incident to an 
est ale in land and passes to said lands." 
* * * * 
.. :\lon.·oyer. it is inunaterial whether the land 
is ronveyed for a tern1 of years, for life or in fee." 
l t is also well established that the landlord may 
ucquire an easc1nent by adverse use over the land of a 
third person by tenants, and that successive adverse 
uses may be tacked: 
''Adverse use of an easement over the land 
of a third person by a tenant under his lease in-
ures to the benefit of the landlord so as to support 
t!te ~~~tter's right to such easement by prescdip-
tion. - ( :~:! 1\.1n. J ur. P. ~4, Sec. 20) . 
* * * * 
···racking users - ,-fhe rule generally followed 
in n1ost .iurisdictions is that to make up the period 
requi1·ed for the acquisition of a prescriptive ease-
ment, successive adverse users by different per-
sons tnay be tacked if there is privity between 
sueh persons. Thus the adverse use of an ease-
Inent over the land of a third person by a tenant 
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under his lease inures to the benefit of the land-
lord so as to support the latter's right to such 
easement by prescription.''-17 Am. Jur. P. 696, 
Sec. 81). 
As the easement acquired was appurtenant to the 
salt lands of the state, the appellant herein as lesse of 
these salt lands, had the right to use this easement. 'fhe 
facts are not complete, but the issue was squarely met. 
Plaintiff claims a right to use the road by his use and 
by use of his predecessors in interest. He produces 
affidavits further framing this issue. The case should 
11ot be tried on these affidavits or on deposition. It 
should be tried! 
3. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT 
ADJUDGE THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC ROAD 
ON RESPONDENT'S AFFIDAVITS AND AP-
PELLANT'S DEPOSITION. 
Appellant feels it should mention one other point. 
Plaintiff pleaded the issue that the road was dedicated 
to public use (page 5, appellant' Brief). Appellant 
did not file affidavits on this issue, deeming it could 
stand on this issue without the necessity of filing affi-
davits as this court ruled a party may stand, in Chris-
tense1t vs. Financial Service Co.~ 377 P (2d) 1010, (page 
12, appellant's Opening Brief). This issue involved 
records and testimony of public officials. Such an issue 
shouldn't be tried by affidavit. Further, it would have 
been idle because the lower court ruled that because 
Salt Lake County had filed an action to declare the 
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rond a puhl il' road. then 'vithout trial, dismissed it by 
stipulation \vith prejudice. no other action could ever 
ht· filed. 'l'his court did not review the District Court 
ruling. It tried the issue of public road on the deposi-
tion ot' appellant \vhose knowledge was limited, then 
· gn ve l'onclusiYe weight on the affidavits of respondent 
und then l'iting a case 'vhich "·as tried on the merits and 
n·hich \\'t' certainly don't quarrel with (Morris vs. Blunt_, 
.f.9 lTt. ~4B. 1(10 )lac. 1127, page ~) rendered this deci-
sion on the Inerits. 
CO~l~LUSION 
i. \ ppellant respectfully submits: 
It' this case is to be tried and judgment rendered 
by this court on the pleadings, depositions and affidavits 
(seep. :!, para. 3, Opinion), despite the decision of this 
court in (,hristcnsen 1.~s. Financial Service Co._, supra, 
then at least it should be tried on the issue that was 
pleaded anti relied upon by appellant. 
If a party 1nay not stand upon his pleadings as ap-
pellunt reads the case of Christensen vs. Financial S erv-
ict' (,u., supra. to hold, this court should say so. 
It' indiYid uuls not parties to a suit, are forever 
bound because a county files a complaint to declare a 
road a public road and then, without trial, stipulates 
to dis1niss it 'vith prejudice, then we respectfully submit,-
the rourt should so rule. 
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Dated: June 11, 1964. 
Respectfully submitted, 
William H. Henderson 
711 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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